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Debating How to Measure Media Exposure in Surveys 
Seth K. Goldman and Stephen M. Warren 
Abstract 
To answer many of the most pressing questions in the social sciences, researchers need reliable 
and valid measures of media exposure that can be implemented in surveys. Despite considerable 
effort, however, substantial disagreement remains about how best to measure this key concept. 
This chapter critically reviews the debate surrounding traditional frequency measures of 
exposure to “news” and contemporary list-based measures of political media exposure. It also 
evaluates the related debate over how best to capture the effects of media exposure with different 
observational research designs. Overall, the chapter finds that although substantial progress has 
been made in measurement and research design, both issues require more attention if scholars are 
to understand the many and varied effects of media exposure. 
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Media exposure is at the core of many of the most pressing questions in the study of politics and 
society. For instance, do media promote tolerance or intolerance toward marginalized social 
groups? Has an increasingly partisan media environment reduced public exposure to a diversity 
of viewpoints? Are media at least partly to blame for political polarization? Is the high-choice 
media environment encouraging political engagement, apathy, or cynicism? Does media 
exposure to impersonal others lead to political trust or wariness? Do coarse and uncivil media 
make it harder for people to empathize with the other side? How does election coverage 
influence citizens’ views of leaders and democratic institutions? Answering these and other 
questions requires reliable and valid measures of media exposure, yet the meaning and 
measurement of this concept remains a matter of debate (de Vreese and Neijens 2016; Jerit and 
Barabas 2011). 
In this chapter, we critically assess several measures of media exposure to politics (for a 
review of exposure measures across topical domains, see Nagler 2018). Our focus is on measures 
that can be implemented in population-based surveys, which are necessary for testing questions 
about media effects in real-world settings. We evaluate evidence from research that tests the 
reliability or validity of one or more measures of political media exposure. Finally, we discuss 
the relative merits of different survey-based research designs for examining the effects of media 
exposure on attitudes and behaviors. Our review reveals significant progress in the measurement 
of political media exposure, as well as in the design of observational media effects studies. 
However, few studies focus on these methodological issues—a serious problem that we hope this 
chapter encourages scholars to address more deeply in the future. 
Traditional Measures 
The conventional approach to measuring media exposure relies on traditional frequency 
measures in which survey respondents are asked how many hours per day or days per week they 
watch, read, or listen to the “news” on a given medium. The most recent iteration of this 
approach, developed by Althaus and Tewksbury (2007a, 2007b) and included on the 2012 
American National Election Study (ANES), asked respondents in a series of questions how many 
days in a typical week they watch, read, or listen to “news on the internet,” “national news on 
TV,” “news in a printed newspaper,” and “news on the radio.” Although the 2016 ANES 
dropped these items due to longstanding concerns about their reliability and validity, many 
scholars continue to use these and similar measures to study the effects of media exposure (e.g., 
Edgerly et al. 2017; Kruikemeier and Shehata 2017). 
The reliability of traditional exposure measures has been in doubt since Bartels (1993) 
identified measurement error as a key explanation for the limited evidence of media effects in 
social science research. Notably, Bartels (1993) offers the only analysis of traditional exposure 
measures that leverages three waves of panel data to calculate “true-score” reliability estimates 
(Wiley and Wiley 1970), which are unique in their ability to separate measurement error from 
true changes in individual levels of media exposure over time. Other types of reliability estimates 
either cannot distinguish between inconsistency in responses over time and real change (e.g., 
test-retest reliability) or only gauge the correlation between different survey items at a single 
point in time (e.g., internal consistency). True-score reliability is thus a much higher standard 
because it estimates the extent to which a measure captures the true values of the variable (Zaller 
2002). Bartels (1993) reported a true-score reliability of 0.75 for the 1980 ANES measure that 
asked, “How often do you watch the national network news on early evening TV—every 
evening, 3 or 4 times a week, once or twice a week, or less often?” 
Scholars often cite Bartels (1993) as evidence of the unreliability of traditional exposure 
measures, but the true-score reliability of the TV exposure measure actually compared favorably 
to several other measures of political constructs. For example, Bartels (1993) found lower levels 
of true-score reliability for standard measures of presidential job approval and issue preferences 
than for TV exposure. Nonetheless, once Bartels (1993) corrected for measurement error in the 
TV exposure measure, he found much stronger evidence of media effects on political opinions. 
The unreliability of traditional exposure measures may be overblown, but so too are claims 
of high reliability based on assessments of internal consistency using Cronbach’s alpha, which 
relies on the strength of inter-item correlations. Using this metric, scholars often report high 
reliabilities for scales of traditional exposure items. For example, Zaller (2002) found that the 
four 1996 ANES days per week items had an alpha reliability of 0.79, and other studies have 
reported similar estimates from multi-item scales (e.g., Chaffee and Schleuder 1986; Price and 
Zaller 1993). However, assessments of internal consistency only show whether several items 
hang together, not whether people are able to consistently report their exposure over time, as 
true-score reliability does. In any case, as the meaning of “news” has become widely debated, 
peoples’ ability to reliably report their levels of news exposure has likely deteriorated. 
Reliability aside, the major focus of criticism of traditional exposure measures is their 
validity, of which the gold standard is political knowledge gain under the assumption that 
exposure to news should impart political information. Traditional exposure measures—even 
those with purportedly high reliability—typically show only weak correlations with political 
knowledge (Zaller 2002). One well-known study examined whether traditional exposure items 
predict recall of current events that had been featured in news coverage (Price and Zaller 1993). 
Across many analyses, the frequency of newspaper and national TV news exposure produced 
small and rarely significant effects on news recall, leading the authors to conclude that scholars 
should abandon the use of self-reports of media exposure altogether (Price and Zaller 1993; see 
also Chang and Krosnick 2003). 
Interestingly, where many see evidence of weak and inconsistent effects, others see evidence 
of reasonably modest effects. Althaus and Tewksbury (2007b, 8) interpreted Price and Zaller’s 
(1993) analyses as demonstrating that “media use adequately predicts knowledge in and of 
itself.” Yet absent a theory as to why traditional exposure measures are only inconsistently 
related to news recall, it is not evident why Price and Zaller’s (1993) findings should be re-
interpreted as evidence of the measures’ validity. Althaus and Tewksbury (2007a, 2007b) also 
reported analyses of the 2006 ANES pilot study that showed some significant relationships 
between traditional exposure measures and perceptions of issue differences between candidates, 
interpersonal political discussion, and political participation, Yet many of the relationships were 
not significant, providing ambiguous evidence of validity overall. 
Although other cross-sectional analyses have found significant relationships between 
traditional exposure measures and political knowledge (Chaffee and Schleuder 1986; Eveland et 
al. 2005; Eveland, Hutchens, and Shen 2009; Tewksbury, Althaus, and Hibbing 2011), the 
implications of these analyses are unclear because they provide weak causal evidence. As Bartels 
(1993, 267) emphasized, “differences in opinions between those exposed to the media and those 
who remain unexposed may simply reflect preexisting differences between the two groups in 
political attitudes or characteristics.” Even after including control variables, unmeasured and/or 
unobservable variables may still produce spurious associations. Reverse causality is also a major 
concern given that those with more preexisting knowledge are more likely to seek out and retain 
new information. The few panel studies that have been employed rely on lagged-dependent 
variable models (LDVMs) which do not overcome these problems either (Allison 1990, 2000). 
Moreover, LDVMs only capture whether the rank-order of individuals changed over time, not 
whether the same individuals exhibited knowledge gains. In sum, prior research has not 
convincingly demonstrated that traditional exposure measures cause political knowledge gain, 
leaving the predictive validity of these measures in question. 
Traditional exposure measures have also been criticized on the grounds of low convergent 
validity due to overreporting. Price and Zaller (1993) reported that 35 percent of respondents in 
the 1989 ANES pilot study said they listened to National Public Radio (NPR) versus 6 percent 
according to Arbitron’s weekly diary data. They also found overreports of reading the Wall 
Street Journal compared to the newspaper’s internal estimates. For national TV news, Prior 
(2009a) compared ratings from Nielsen’s people-meter data to a question from the 2000 National 
Annenberg Election Survey (NAES), which asked “How many days in the past week did you 
watch the national network news on TV—by national news, I mean Peter Jennings on ABC, Dan 
Rather on CBS, Tom Brokaw on NBC, Fox News or UPN News?” Based on Nielsen’s ratings, 
Prior (2009a) estimated that on an average weekday between 30 and 35 million people watched 
one of the three broadcast news programs—UPN and the Fox broadcast network did not have 
such programs—whereas between 85 and 110 million did according to the NAES. These 
comparisons are problematic, however, because surveys and ratings data use different metrics 
and often refer to different sources; moreover, the ratings data themselves have been criticized as 
unreliable and lacking validity (Economist 2013; Milavsky 1992; Napoli 2003). 
Still, some degree of overreporting is likely, and scholars have pointed to two possible 
explanations: social desirability bias and the high cognitive burden placed on respondents. 
According to the social desirability hypothesis, respondents inflate their reported news viewing 
because they perceive a norm of democratic citizenship that includes being knowledgeable of 
current events. Plausible as this explanation may be, the available evidence does not support it. 
One survey showed only a weak correlation between an individual’s propensity to engage in 
socially desirable responding and their self-reported news use (Eveland et al. 2009), and a list 
experiment revealed no differences in self-reported exposure between those asked about their 
viewing directly versus indirectly (Prior 2009b). 
The more likely explanation for overreporting is the high cognitive burden placed on 
respondents. Answering a traditional exposure question involves a multistage process in which 
respondents must understand the question—including what counts as “news”—accurately recall 
their frequency of past exposure, and then map their recollections onto the response options in 
the question (Schwarz and Oyserman 2001). Experiments embedded in national surveys reveal 
that respondents do not misreport their exposure for lack of effort but instead because of flawed 
estimation strategies. People appear to infer from their interest in politics and the (mistaken) 
assumption that most people watch the news that they probably watch the news, too (Prior 
2009b). Giving people more time to think about how often they watch the news did not reduce 
overreporting, but telling them that most people do not watch the news did. 
Importantly, even if people do significantly overreport their news exposure, it may not 
undercut media effects research insofar as self-report measures still appear to capture more 
signal than noise. One study compared passive tracking data collected by individuals’ cell 
phones to a survey question that asked, “How much time do you spend watching TV news in a 
typical day” (never, fewer than two hours, between two and four hours, or more than four hours) 
(LaCour and Vavreck 2014). About four-in-ten participants overreported their news exposure, 
yet most provided either accurate reports or underreports, and self-reports were positively and 
significantly related to actual exposure. Overall, those who reported higher exposure did have a 
greater likelihood of actually seeing or hearing more news. 
Despite this positive result, concerns about the reliability and validity of traditional 
frequency measures of media exposure remain widespread. The growing fragmentation of the 
media environment presents an even greater challenge. Measures of exposure to “national TV 
news” or “news on the internet” are useful only insofar as there are consistent messages across 
sources within a given medium. Even then, respondents are unlikely to agree on what “news” 
means anymore, adding considerable uncertainty to the interpretation of any observed effects of 
exposure. What most scholars ultimately care about is the impact of exposure to particular 
messages or types of content (Slater 2004), and in the current information environment the 
content people encounter varies widely across sources. Because traditional measures do not 
capture exposure to those distinctive messages, we turn to a new class of measures that do. 
List-Based Measures 
In recent years, scholars have increasingly relied on list-based measures of media exposure in 
which survey respondents are presented with lists of individual sources, rather than researcher-
defined categories, and asked which they use regularly. In one formulation, first included on the 
2008 NAES internet panel survey, respondents are provided with lists of the most watched 
politically relevant television programs—including nightly network news, morning shows, 
opinion programs, newsmagazines, daytime talk shows, and satire—and asked to check off the 
ones that they watch regularly, defined as at least once per month (Dilliplane, Goldman, and 
Mutz 2013). This approach has been extended beyond television to other media, though debate 
remains about its conceptualization and implementation (Anderson, de Vreese, and Albaek 2016; 
Guess 2015; Prior 2013). 
The benefits of list-based measures are two-fold. First, they capture exposure to a wider 
range of politically relevant content than traditional exposure measures, while reducing the 
cognitive burden placed on respondents. Respondents need not understand what counts under the 
umbrella of news, a category that may have once been obvious in its meaning but which now is 
highly disputed. Respondents with differing definitions of news need only recognize and check 
off individual sources that they use regularly. This also alleviates the need for respondents to 
engage in the mental arithmetic required to calculate frequency of use in days per week or hours 
per day. As an approach designed to test theories of media effects, regular use captures the type 
of cumulative exposure most likely to influence attitudes and behaviors. 
Second, the list-based approach encompasses the varied ways in which people now 
encounter political content in the media. In addition to national network news programs, citizens 
are now exposed to political content through morning shows, back-to-back news programs on 
cable networks, and even daytime talk shows, which periodically include political issues and 
candidates, especially during election campaigns. Many people have also turned to alternative 
formats such as opinion programs and late-night satire that do not claim to be news but which 
still impart political information. Given the large and ever-changing menu of options available, a 
measure that allows researchers to add or subtract sources to most appropriately test relevant 
theories of influence is of increasing value. Additionally, the list-based approach easily captures 
exposure across the growing number of media platforms, as well as both concurrent and time-
delayed media use. 
To assess the reliability of the list-based measure of political television exposure, Dilliplane 
et al. (2013) used three waves of nationally representative panel data fielded over the internet 
during the 2008 presidential election, gathered as part of the 2008 NAES. They calculated true-
score reliabilities (Heise 1969) of 0.83 for an indicator of the total number of politically relevant 
programs viewed, 0.84 for an indicator weighted by each program’s level of campaign content, 
and 0.88 for the individual programs (averaged across all 49 programs asked about in the 
survey). Notably, these true-score reliabilities are higher than Bartels (1993) reported for a 
traditional “days per week” measure of television news exposure (0.75). 
For tests of predictive validity, Dilliplane et al. (2013) employed fixed effects models of 
within-person change (Allison 2009), which showed that within-person increases in the number 
of programs viewed significantly predicted within-person gains over time in knowledge of 
candidate issue positions. In other words, the same exact individuals who increased in their 
political television viewing also increased in their levels of political knowledge. Stable levels of 
exposure based on average viewing across all three waves also predicted knowledge gains. As 
expected, the measure weighted by level of campaign content produced the strongest results. The 
number of programs viewed uniquely predicted levels of visual candidate knowledge as well 
(i.e., recognition of candidate faces). In sum, across numerous analyses, the list-based measure 
demonstrated strong true-score reliability, predictive validity, and discriminant validity. 
Debating the Merits of the List-Based Approach 
In 2012, the ANES added list-based measures of exposure to political television programs, radio 
programs, websites, and print and online newspapers to its pre-election survey, in addition to the 
traditional frequency measures of news exposure. Soon after, Prior (2013) offered a variety of 
critiques of the list-based approach, and Goldman, Mutz, and Dilliplane (2013) responded in 
turn. 
Prior’s (2013) first critique concerns construct validity, or the extent to which a measure taps 
the underlying concept of interest. He argued that the construct validity of the new measure is 
low because it places a high cognitive burden on respondents, who are unlikely to remember the 
names of most programs that they view, and fails to capture frequency of exposure. Because the 
measure neglects the duration of viewing, someone who watches two programs on one day could 
be scored as having greater exposure than someone who watches one program every day. 
Goldman et al. (2013) responded that the list-based approach was originally designed to 
measure media exposure among children (e.g., Huesmann et al. 2003) and requires less cognitive 
effort than traditional measures. The measure’s high true-score reliability also suggests that 
people can, in fact, recognize the programs that they watch regularly. Moreover, two studies that 
do not rely on self-reports found a close correspondence between the number of programs 
viewed and the total frequency of viewing. According to an analysis of Dutch people-meter data, 
the “duration and the number of programs [is] nearly perfectly related” (Wonneberger, 
Schoenbach, and Meurs 2013, 95; see also LaCour and Vavreck 2014). 
Prior’s (2013) second critique involves convergent validity, or the extent to which 
independent measures of the same concept produce similar results. He reported that 34 percent, 
35 percent, and 35 percent of respondents checked off “Fox News” in waves 2, 4, and 5 of the 
2008 NAES, whereas Nielsen data showed that only 10 percent and 13 percent of adults watched 
Fox News Channel (FNC) for at least 60 minutes during 2-week periods in April (wave 2) and 
October (wave 4) 2008. He noted that 26 percent, 30 percent, and 29 percent of adults watched at 
least 6 minutes of FNC per month during waves 2, 4, and 5, but dismissed those estimates as 
counting incidental viewers. Finally, he argued that the NAES measure failed to pick up 
increases in exposure late in the campaign. 
In reply, Goldman et al. (2013) found that Nielsen has serious faults in its people-meter 
system and sampling (Milavsky 1992; Napoli 2003), and did not capture out-of-home viewing or 
exposure over the internet or on mobile devices (Economist 2013; Napoli 2003). Even if one 
does use Nielsen, the 6-minute cume for FNC corresponded to the NAES estimates. A rank 
ordering of programs by popularity also showed a strong parallel between the Nielsen and list-
based estimates (Dilliplane et al. 2013). Finally, Goldman et al. (2013) reported a significant 
increase in the number of programs viewed as the 2008 election neared. 
Prior’s (2013) third critique concerns predictive validity, or whether a measure predicts 
future values of a criterion variable. He argued that political knowledge is an inappropriate 
criterion variable because news exposure is neither necessary nor sufficient to produce political 
learning and the true relationship between news exposure and political knowledge is unknown. 
He also suggested that Dilliplane et al. (2013) included weak controls for other media and 
omitted controls for exposure to political advertising, the party conventions, the presidential 
debates, and interpersonal discussion. 
Goldman et al. (2013) responded that political television exposure does not need to be 
necessary or sufficient to have a causal impact on political knowledge and that the fixed effects 
panel models used by Dilliplane et al. (2013) provide unusually strong causal evidence (Allison 
2009). The analyses included multiple controls for exposure to other media, and exposure to 
political television appropriately captured advertising, the conventions, and debates. Finally, 
interpersonal discussion is a potential mediator of media influence (Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955), 
yet controlling for it did not change the original findings (Goldman et al. 2013). 
In his last critique, Prior (2013) argued that reliability is independent of, and less important 
than, validity, and that reliability estimates are upwardly biased due to correlated errors from 
overreporting. As noted by Goldman et al. (2013), however, Prior (2013) seems to confuse test-
retest reliability, which is independent of validity, and true-score reliability, which represents the 
squared correlation between the observed score and true score, where “the distinction between 
reliability and validity does not exist” (Zaller 2002, 315). Moreover, even if correlated errors 
inflated the reliability estimates, this would not affect the predictive validity analyses because 
fixed effects regression assumes correlated errors (Allison 2009). With fixed effects, all stable 
individual differences, including consistent overreporting, automatically drop out. 
Overall, the list-based measure has demonstrated strong reliability and validity and offers a 
clear improvement over traditional exposure measures, which have lower true-score reliability 
and have never been shown to predict within-person gains in political knowledge over time. 
Scholars have fruitfully employed the list-based approach to test a range of hypotheses, such as 
the effects of exposure to partisan (Dilliplane 2011, 2014; Moehler and Allen 2016), uncivil 
(Gervais 2014), and prejudice-reducing media (Goldman and Mutz 2014). The measure is also 
well-suited for linking individual-level survey data with content analyses, enabling more 
sophisticated tests of media influence (Jerit and Barabas 2011; Valkenburg and Peter 2013). 
The List-Frequency Technique 
As the list-based approach has grown in use, it has also become the subject of revision and 
extension. Most notably, Anderson et al. (2016) suggest that the measure could be improved in 
several ways, in particular by incorporating frequency of use. They dub the revised measure “the 
list-frequency technique,” because it asks respondents how many days in the past week they used 
each source. The authors suggest that using the “past week” time frame minimizes the cognitive 
demands placed on respondents, increases observed variation over time in exposure, and 
improves precision in linkage analyses that combine self-reports with content analyses. 
To assess the convergent validity of the list-frequency technique, Anderson et al. (2016) 
used an experiment embedded in a 2014 national survey in Denmark. Respondents were 
randomly assigned to the list-based measure or the list-frequency technique, with each including 
twelve newspapers, eight radio programs, eighteen television shows, and fifteen websites. The 
results showed no significant differences between conditions in the percent of respondents who 
used each media outlet, supporting the convergent validity of the list-frequency measure. 
For tests of predictive validity, Anderson et al. (2016) used a two-wave panel survey that 
included list-frequency measures for three newspapers, four radio programs, six television 
shows, and five websites, with responses summed into indexes for each medium. LDVMs 
showed that the exposure measures significantly predicted greater wave 2 current events 
knowledge. To examine whether frequency of use added explanatory power, the authors created 
dichotomous variables for each exposure measure to approximate the list-based approach. Cross-
sectional analyses showed that the list-frequency measures explained slightly more variance in 
knowledge, but only to a significant degree in the case of newspaper exposure. 
Anderson et al.’s (2016) extension of the list-based approach is well-motivated and provides 
a rare empirical assessment of the value added of measuring frequency of media exposure. That 
said, based on the evidence provided, we do not yet see a clear advantage of adding frequency 
estimates to the list-based approach. It has long been a concern that respondents cannot 
accurately recall their frequency of media use; indeed, this was one of the main critiques of 
traditional exposure measures. People might be able to more reliably report their frequency of 
using individual sources than researcher-defined categories of news, but testing this idea requires 
true-score reliability estimates of the list-frequency measures using three or more waves of panel 
data. Such data would also enable tests of whether list-frequency measures predict individual-
level knowledge gains over time. In sum, future research should continue to investigate the 
utility of the list-frequency technique. 
Capturing Exposure to Political Websites 
As people increasingly turn to the internet for political content, technological changes may alter 
our understanding of media effects theories (Mutz and Young 2011). Unfortunately, systematic 
assessment of measures of online media exposure remains largely neglected. In a rare exception, 
Guess (2015) tested the validity of three self-report measures of exposure to political websites. In 
three experiments, all fielded over Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk), respondents 
answered one of three exposure measures. The first, a list-based measure, showed respondents a 
list of twenty-seven websites and asked them to check off those they had visited in the past thirty 
days for news. The second, a forced-choice measure, asked respondents to indicate “Yes” or 
“No” next to each site. The third measure provided respondents with a blank text box and asked 
them to list any websites they had visited for news in the past thirty days. 
The tests of convergent validity relied on novel indicators of “true” exposure (Guess 2015). 
Two experiments used the “link classification technique,” which takes advantage of web 
browsers automatically storing the links of sites that users visit, and then presenting visited and 
unvisited links in different colors. Respondents were shown a list of 155 hyperlinks, each labeled 
as “LINK” and asked to check off the visited sites shown in purple. As a robustness check, in the 
third experiment respondents were asked to install a widget that encoded their browsing history 
from the last 30 days. Based on these indicators, the list-based measure showed modest 
overreporting, as respondents reported visiting 2.33 more sites on average than the link-
classification estimate. The forced-choice measure produced even more overreporting (4.15 more 
sites on average), while the open-ended measure did not produce significant overreporting (0.80 
more sites on average) but did produce under-reporting of some sites. Overall, the open-ended 
and list-based measures did not differ in total misreporting. 
The third experiment included tests of predictive validity based on the ability of each 
exposure measure to predict news recall, as measured by an index of the number of correct 
answers to three questions about recent news stories (Guess 2015). Controlling for general 
political knowledge and demographic characteristics, the list-based measure significantly 
predicted news recall, the open-ended measure produced an even larger effect, and the forced-
choice measure had no impact. These findings support the predictive validity of the list-based 
and open-ended measures, but not the forced-choice measure. 
For assessing exposure to political websites, the list-based and open-ended measures are 
promising. In both cases, we would recommend excluding reference to news in the questions 
given the ambiguous and debated meaning of the term. Although Guess (2015) found that the 
list-based measure showed some overreporting, the indictors of true exposure used for 
comparison likely underestimated exposure levels by capturing media use on only one device 
and only when respondents visited a website’s homepage. Nonetheless, the list-based measure 
predicted news recall, and the open-ended measure performed even more strongly, despite small 
sample sizes and an outcome variable with limited variance. In terms of implementation in large-
scale surveys, the list-based measure is the most feasible, though further research employing 
open-ended measures of media exposure is clearly warranted. 
The Challenge of Measuring Social Media Exposure 
Popular surveys suggest that a growing number of people get news at least some of the time from 
social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, YouTube,  Pinterest, Instagram, Tumblr, 
LinkedIn, and Reddit (e.g., Pew Research Center 2018). Although surveys increasingly include 
questions about social media use, research pertaining to the validity of these measures is sparse. 
To date, scholars have relied primarily on two approaches to gauging social media use. The first 
approach asks respondents whether they use social media at all. For example, Gottfried, Hardy, 
Holbert et al. (2017) asked respondents, “Do you ever use social networking sites such as Twitter 
or Facebook?” (yes or no). The second and more commonly used approach presents a list of 
social media sites and asks respondents how frequently they use each one to get news or political 
information, with response options ranging from the subjective (e.g., “never” to “all the time”) to 
specific time periods (e.g., days per week). 
The standard criterion for assessing the validity of media exposure measures is political 
knowledge gain, yet it is not clear that social media should be expected to produce learning of 
this kind. On the one hand, an experiment showed that social media exposure can produce gains 
in political knowledge (Bode 2016). On the other hand, research combining a survey with a 
Facebook application that collected participants’ newsfeeds found no relationship between the 
presence of news stories on Facebook and individuals’ knowledge of those same stories (Wells 
and Thorson 2017). Studies relying on self-reports offer mixed evidence as well. One cross-
sectional analysis revealed a significant positive relationship between having ever used Twitter 
or Facebook and campaign knowledge (Gottfried et al. 2017), while another revealed a positive 
impact of using Twitter, but not Facebook, on knowledge of current events (Bode 2016). 
Moreover, five survey-based studies that asked respondents how often they followed news about 
politics or campaigns using each of several social media sites found no positive relationship 
between exposure to those sites and knowledge about politics or current events (Dimitrova et al. 
2011; Gil de Zuniga, Weeks, and Ardevol-Abreu 2017; Groshek and Dimitrova 2011; Shehata 
and Stromback 2018; Wolfsfeld, Yarchi, and Samuel-Azran 2015). Taken together, prior 
research provides limited evidence that self-reported social media use is associated with political 
learning. 
One interpretation of this weak relationship is that current measures of social media uselack 
predictive validity. Another interpretation is that knowledge gain is an inappropriate criterion 
variable for assessing the validity of these measures. Many suggest that social media use is better 
suited for promoting political participation, as indicated by a large-scale Facebook experiment, 
however it is not clear if naturally occurring social media use increases participation(Bond et al. 
2012). Although cross-sectional correlations between self-reported social media use and political 
participation abound, panel studies that provide stronger causal evidence are less common and 
reveal fewer significant associations (Boulianne 2015). 
The inconsistency with which self-reported social media use predicts gains in either political 
knowledge or participation suggests that measurement error may be at least partly to blame 
(Bartels 1993). Asking respondents if they use social media for getting news introduces error due 
to widely varying interpretations of what counts as news. And asking about frequency of use 
introduces error owing to imperfect memory, especially for common behaviors like social media 
use. In addition, many measures only ask whether respondents purposefully use social media for 
getting news or following politics, which may miss a potentially large number of people for 
whom exposure to politics is incidental. A list-based measure which asks respondents whether 
they have heard anything about an electoral campaign or politics on each of several social media 
sites could reduce measurement error while still capturing incidental exposure. Unfortunately, a 
list-based measure cannot distinguish between exposure to different messages and types of 
content within a given social media site. For this purpose, self-reports combined with passive 
tracking data of each respondent’s social media feed will likely be necessary to test theories of 
individual-level media effects. 
Research Design 
The question of how to measure political media exposure is interrelated with how to capture the 
effects of exposure on attitudes and behaviors. An ideal research design maximizes observed 
variation in the independent and dependent variables, while minimizing threats to causal 
inference (i.e., spuriousness and reverse causality). For example, the challenge of observing 
variation in media exposure is particularly notable in the debate over the influence of US 
presidential campaigns on vote choice. While the public perceives campaigns as powerful, 
academic research has shown small-to-null effects (Mutz 2012). As Zaller (1996) argued, 
however, there could be massive effects that are difficult to observe. Because presidential 
campaigns tend to be evenly matched, their effects may cancel out, leaving little observed 
variation in net exposure to campaign appeals. This problem is compounded by the static design 
of most election studies, which, combined with small samples and low statistical power (Zaller 
2002), severely limits scholars’ ability to capture the effects of media exposure on vote choice. 
The use of cross-sectional surveys in most observational media effects studies also 
undercuts the ability of scholars to make causal inferences due to numerous threats to internal 
validity (Banducci et al. 2017). Although comparing individuals with higher levels of media 
exposure to those with lower levels of exposure exploits substantial between-person variation, 
any differences in attitudes or behaviors between those individuals may be due to any number of 
confounding factors that may produce spurious associations (Bartels 1993). Importantly, no 
amount of statistical wizardry can solve this fundamental problem of causal inference with 
between-person comparisons. Even sophisticated matching techniques, which rely on fewer 
modeling assumptions than standard regression analyses, cannot control for unmeasured and/or 
unobservable factors, not to mention reverse causality (Banducci et al. 2017). 
A stronger design that has come into greater use is the rolling cross-sectional survey (Brady 
and Johnston 2006), which randomly assigns respondents a date of interview over a period of 
weeks or months. Assuming large enough daily samples, researchers can identify the effects of 
campaign events and abrupt shifts in media coverage, so long as other environmental influences 
are ruled out (Johnston, Hagen, and Jamieson 2004). Analyses of campaign dynamics take place 
at the aggregate-level, usually through graphical analysis of daily trends in beliefs and vote 
intentions alongside trends in media coverage (Kenski, Hardy, and Jamieson 2010). The major 
limitation of these analyses is the lack of direct evidence connecting media exposure with 
changes in attitudes at the individual level. Although researchers can compare trends among 
those with differing levels of self-reported media exposure, such between-person comparisons 
again raise the specter of spuriousness due to individual differences. 
Ultimately, the best strategy for ruling out alternative explanations stemming from 
individual differences is to discard potentially contaminated between-person variance and instead 
rely strictly on within-person variance. For this task, panel data are necessary but not sufficient. 
The traditional approach to analyzing panel data using lagged dependent variable models 
(LDVMs) still relies entirely on between-person variance. Researchers often describe LDVMs as 
demonstrating individual-level change, but this is a misnomer as these models only reveal 
change in the rank-order of individuals. As a result, LDVMs often provide results that make little 
substantive sense when compared to the underlying distribution of responses (Allison 1990). By 
contrast, fixed effects regression models rely solely on within-person variance and assess 
whether each individual has changed in her attitudes over time (Allison 2009). 
The benefits of fixed effects regression for disentangling the impact of media exposure from 
individual differences are enormous: by using each respondent as her own control, the stable 
effects of all individual differences automatically drop out. Each respondent is compared to 
herself at an earlier point in time, so the main effects of factors like education, political interest, 
gender, and party identification are all controlled. Indeed, if one tries to include stable variables 
in a fixed effects model they will not appear in the output. More important than controlling for 
factors that we already know about and can measure is that fixed effects models automatically 
control for the stable effects of every other factor that we do not know about and/or cannot 
measure (i.e., unobserved heterogeneity). Including a variable for panel wave efficiently captures 
the sum total of all other changes (i.e., period effects) (Halaby 2004). 
The remaining routes through which spuriousness can influence fixed effects models are 
limited. Because the main effects of individual differences automatically drop out, only their 
time-varying components can be influential. These time-varying components can be modeled 
with interactions between individual difference variables and survey wave. Unsurprisingly, 
including these controls rarely alters the size or significance of media exposure variables 
(Dilliplane 2011; Dilliplane et al. 2013; Goldman 2012; Goldman and Mutz 2014). Factors that 
change over time represent another plausible, albeit unlikely, influence. With the wave variable 
already capturing factors that change uniformly over time, a spurious confounder would have to 
change differentially among individuals, and those changes would have to be correlated with 
changes in both the independent and dependent variables. Few factors plausibly fit this bill, and 
including them typically leaves most estimates of media impact unaffected. 
With fixed effects, one can model the influence of media exposure in two ways. The first is 
a change-on-change model that requires repeated measurements of media exposure. For 
example, using three waves of panel data Dilliplane et al. (2013) found that within-person 
change in the number of political TV programs viewed significantly predicted within-person 
change in knowledge of candidate issue positions during the 2008 US presidential campaign. The 
second type of model examines the time-varying effects of a stable indicator of media exposure. 
Here, Dilliplane et al. (2013) created a scale that averaged self-reports of media exposure across 
all three waves and then examined the interaction of the exposure scale with the wave variable. 
They found a positive interaction, indicating that stable levels of exposure predicted within-
person gains in knowledge. Each modeling strategy has distinct benefits. The change-on-change 
model does a superior job of controlling for unobservables, though limited within-person 
variation in exposure can produce conservative estimates of effect size (Allison 2009). Using 
stable exposure, on the other hand, captures the habitual character of media exposure and can 
help rule out reverse causality. 
Given the range of research designs available, some suggest using as many as possible—
including between-subjects models—in order to demonstrate the robustness of one’s results 
(Banducci et al. 2017). Yet given that the internal validity of between-subjects models is widely 
suspect, it is not evident why the results would be informative. All research designs are not 
equally able to rule out alternative explanations (Campbell and Stanley 1963), which suggests 
that scholars should use the best possible research design available for the purpose at hand. For 
example, Goldman and Mutz (2014) used the 2008 NAES internet panel survey, which 
combined the panel and rolling cross-sectional designs, to link respondents’ date of interview 
with the results of a content analysis. A fixed effects model of within-person change then showed 
that increases over time in political TV viewing produced the largest declines in racial prejudice 
when accompanied by increases over time in coverage of Barack Obama refuting anti-Black 
stereotypes. Although one could also carry out between-subjects analyses of these data, those 
results—whatever they showed—would provide weak causal evidence. 
Conclusion 
Traditional measures of media exposure have long been debated and widely ridiculed on the 
grounds of low reliability and validity. Especially since Price and Zaller’s (1993) landmark 
study, the ability of traditional frequency measures to capture the extent to which people watch, 
read, or listen to the news has been suspect, leading Bartels (1993, 267) to famously proclaim 
that, “The state of research on media effects is one of the most notable embarrassments of 
modern social science.” Perhaps this was just the wake-up call scholars needed. As this review 
shows, although consensus remains elusive, there has been substantial progress in the 
measurement and evaluation of the effects of media exposure. 
With regard to measurement, early critiques of traditional measures are less clear-cut than 
many assumed. Findings widely interpreted as showing low reliability of traditional measures 
fare well relative to many survey measures of political constructs (Bartels 1993). Evidence of 
low predictive validity (Price and Zaller 1993) has also been interpreted by some as showing 
sensible, if modest, relationships (Althaus and Tewksbury 2007a, 2007b). However, no study to 
our knowledge has used panel data to examine whether change over time in the frequency of 
news exposure predicts individual knowledge gain. But perhaps most surprising is recent 
evidence of convergent validity: despite some overreporting, an hours-per-day measure of TV 
news exposure still distinguished between those with high versus low levels of actual news 
viewing based on passive tracking data (LaCour and Vavreck 2014). 
Nonetheless, the utility of traditional exposure measures has declined drastically with the 
end of the broadcast era of TV news (Delli Carpini and Williams 2011). The menu of media 
options has grown exponentially, the line between news and entertainment has blurred, and 
audiences have fragmented. Scholars now want to understand the effects of exposure to the 
varied forms of politically relevant content available across platforms, devices, and viewing 
behaviors. For these purposes, list-based measures that are able to capture exposure to the 
specific TV programs, newspapers, radio shows, and websites people use are far more useful 
than indicators of exposure to “national TV news” or “news on the internet.” List-based 
measures have shown strong reliability and validity, and efforts to improve and expand on this 
approach have led to applications across a variety of media contexts. 
Recent advances notwithstanding, we see more need than ever for a renewed scholarly focus 
on issues of measurement and research design, which still receive far less attention than they 
deserve. For instance, scholars have only just begun to investigate the complexity of citizens’ 
media diets (Moehler and Allen 2016), consumption patterns across convergent media on mobile 
devices (Ohme, Albaek, and de Vreese 2016), and multitasking behaviors (Gottfried et al. 2017). 
Yet despite these challenges, understanding how people use and respond to political media is 
necessary in order to confront many of the most important issues facing democratic institutions. 
Although the debate over how to measure media exposure will undoubtedly continue, it is just as 
clear that scholars have never been better positioned to make use of this key scientific concept to 
promote societal well-being. 
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